


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Peace - Keeping:
Principles, Problems, Prospects

Dr. Shashi Tharoor

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PEACE-KEEPING: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS

In this adaptation of the keynote address delivered at the Strategic Research Department sponsored conference on "Options for U.S. Participation in United Nations Sanctioned Military Operations," Dr. Shashi Tharoor, a Special Assistant to the UN Under-Secretary General for Peace-Keeping, provides a unique insider's view of the challenges of peacekeeping.

Dr. Tharoor argues persuasively that the UN must not allow the cachet of traditional peacekeeping operations to be devalued by the lack of success that has beset recent, more muscular, operations. He also provokes us as readers by confronting us with the types of questions that challenge the UN Secretariat everyday. His position in the UN Secretariat exposes him to both the theories of academics and the real problems of the international military contingents asked to carry out Security Council mandates. His thoughtful discussion of how policy decisions can affect isolated peacekeepers in precarious circumstances forces us to move from theory to reality.

The portrait of the future Dr. Tharoor paints can be characterized neither as pessimistic nor optimistic—the international community has yet to put a face on it. Our hope is that his ideas will continue to provide food for thought and serve as a catalyst for further discussions of the United Nations role in peacekeeping operations.

Donald C. Daniel

Dr. Donald C. Daniel
Director Strategic Research
Department
Center for Naval Warfare Studies

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This paper will also appear as an article in the Spring 1994 issue of the *Naval War College Review*. It is an adaptation of a speech given on 31 March 1993 to participants of a conference at the Naval War College on "Options for U.S. Participation in United Nations Sanctioned Military Operations" which was sponsored by the Strategic Research Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
Letter of Promulgation	i
Acknowledgements	iii
Table of Contents	v
Peace-Keeping: Principles, Problems, Prospects	1
The Evolution of Peace-Keeping	2
Five Types of Peace-Keeping Operations	3
Principles Under Pressure	4
Challenge and Opportunity	8
Endnotes	10

Peace-Keeping: Principles, Problems, Prospects

Shashi Tharoor

SPEAKING ON THE PRINCIPLES, problems, and prospects of United Nations peace-keeping these days is not a very cost-efficient activity. The principles, prospects and certainly the problems now change so rapidly and so often that a prepared text would have a very, very short shelf-life.

Notwithstanding, this is a particularly timely moment to look at peace-keeping, especially in view of the sheer numbers involved. The United Nations has thirteen peace-keeping operations currently under way. (Some would say, in fact, that it ought to be fifteen, because what counts as one in the former Yugoslavia is really three very distinct and different operations under one label.¹) These thirteen operations involve something like 60,000 peace-keepers around the world, from seventy-four different countries. Since thirteen is

Adapted from an address delivered on 31 March 1993 to participants of a conference at the Naval War College on "Options for U.S. Participation in United Nations-Sanctioned Military Operations." Endnotes have been used to update figures and points of fact to December 1993.

Dr. Tharoor is the Special Assistant to the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping. He has served the United Nations since May 1978, including as head of the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Singapore during the "boat people" crisis. An award-winning writer, Shashi Tharoor is the author of four books, including *The Great Indian Novel*, as well as articles and commentaries in the Indian and international press. In his present functions he heads the team at the U.N. Department of Peace-Keeping Operations that is responsible for the peace-keeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

The author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of Dr. Don Daniel and Captain Bradd Hayes of the Naval War College in readying this transcript for publication.

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"the auspicious number," let me mention that it took forty-three years for the first thirteen U.N. peace-keeping operations to be set up, from the establishment of the U.N. in 1945 to 1988. After that we had thirteen peace-keeping operations in forty-three *months* from 1988 to 1992.

There has thus been a dramatic growth in recent years. What has been striking in the course of the last year has been the *quintupling* of the forces that the United Nations has in the field. There were at the beginning of last year 11,500 in the field. Today, we have somewhere in the neighbourhood of 60,000, and the figure seems to be climbing.² It includes about 4,500 police but does not count the increasing number of civilian staff. Right now we have two of the largest peace-keeping operations in the history of the United Nations, in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia.³

So it is not surprising that people are talking about the "renaissance of peace-keeping." We see today that the U.N.'s Member States are far more ready and willing to use this technique of peace-keeping operations than ever before, and there is a wider recognition of its usefulness. At the same time, there is more questioning of the resilience of the U.N. system in the face of this unprecedented demand for its services, and also fair questions about our ability—the ability of the United Nations as it is constituted today—to cope with what the Secretary-General has already described as a "crisis of too much credibility."

The Evolution of Peace-Keeping

At the risk of saying what may be fairly basic, let me situate peace-keeping in context before moving on to contemporary problems. It's interesting, of course, that peace-keeping—this vital U.N. activity engaging so many people from around the world—is not even mentioned in the United Nations Charter. It was invented by the United Nations after the Charter was graven in stone, as a noncoercive instrument of conflict control, at a time when the Cold War and its constraints prevented the Security Council from taking the steps that had in fact been outlined in the Charter. Of course, Article 1 of the Charter has it that the first purpose of the U.N. is the maintenance of international peace and security. There are concrete measures set out in the Charter to ensure this, both in Chapter Six, which talks about the "peaceful settlement of disputes" finding solu-

tions by negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and other peaceful means—and in Chapter Seven, which provides for enforcement measures in case of threats to international peace and security, if Chapter Six doesn't work. But "peace-keeping" is not mentioned in either chapter. These two chapters do not cover the entire range of possibilities, and we have had occasion over the years, in the pursuit of the restoration of peace and security when conflicts have occurred, to use techniques not specifically provided for in the Charter.

Of course, the Charter defines a whole system, one including strategic direction from the Military Staff Committee under articles 46 and 47, and a series of procedures including binding agreements by Member States with the Security Council to provide armed forces to the U.N. under Article 43—all of which could really work only if there had been full agreement and co-operation amongst the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. During the Cold War, of course, this was rare. There was a vacuum—the Military Staff Council was largely dormant—and into this vacuum came what former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld called "Chapter Six-and-a-Half": a way of trying to move from the peaceful techniques of Chapter Six toward the use of military force as foreseen in Chapter Seven, but without the techniques and methods described in Chapter Seven. We called the result "peace-keeping."

Peace-keeping was thus largely an interim measure to supplement what was already provided for in the Charter. It was improvised *ad hoc* from the very beginning; even the great symbol of the blue helmet was improvised (the blue helmet came into being when we suddenly needed infantry after the Suez crisis in '56, by the simple expedient of dipping vast quantities of U.S. Army World War II surplus helmets into vats of blue paint). From that kind of improvisation arose a pragmatic tool—a tool that was extemporized in relation to the specific requirements and circumstances of each particular situation, and whose doctrines emerged from the practice of what was possible. And of course, whereas the Charter had, implicitly and to some degree explicitly, seemed to envision using mainly the military force of the big powers to maintain peace around the world, peace-keeping used largely the military forces of the smaller powers.

From these *ad hoc* beginnings, peace-keeping evolved as an institution and gained in complexity with each passing operation.⁴ In looking at these changes, it is possible to identify five different types of what in the United Nations are collectively referred to as "peace-

keeping operations," some of which were not in evidence as recently as a year ago. Though it is fashionable to speak of a "continuum" of international military intervention possibilities, I would rather take up these different types of peace-keeping in the order of their increasing distance from the familiar—that is, from what the U.N. has proven it can do well, from what it has traditionally taken for granted.⁵

Five Types of Peace-Keeping Operations

What are these basic types? The first, obviously, is what most people tend to think of as *traditional peace-keeping*: United Nations military observers or lightly armed infantry deployed between or among hostile parties in order to help end hostilities, to reduce the risk of the conflict recurring. Many examples come readily to mind: amongst current operations, UNFICYP in Cyprus controlling the "Green Line"; UNDOF on the Golan Heights, along the demilitarized zone between the Israelis and the Syrians; also, indeed, the two other operations in the Middle East, UNTSO and UNIFIL. Here not only the goals but the tasks are traditional, using well-worn and well-practised military techniques familiar to every army around the globe: interposition of forces, patrolling, observation, maintaining and upholding cease-fires, seeking essentially to create favorable conditions for the negotiators, for the diplomats, for the peacemakers, buying time for the ultimate political solution—not serving as the solution itself. This kind of traditional peace-keeping does not even pretend to tackle the root problems of the hostilities; it is, overwhelmingly, a military activity.

Second in our typology, if we can call it that, is something that became frequent in the 1980s: the use of peace-keeping in the *implementation of complex agreements and settlements*. This variant would involve the supervision or monitoring of agreements amongst various parties and would include not just military but often extensive civilian components. I think that the classic example is the operation in Namibia, UNTAG, which helped bring that country to independence; currently, we have also El Salvador (ONUSAL) and Cambodia (UNTAC), where the peace-keeping forces are part of packages of measures agreed to by the parties, usually under international auspices. These measures are intended to end the conflict by addressing the root causes, and the operation helps resolve the underlying political problems that made it necessary. All manner of

additional activities have been thrown in, such as civilians "policing" the local police (which worked very effectively in Namibia and has been tried elsewhere, sometimes with less happy results); peace-keepers, either civilian or military, directly or indirectly upholding human rights; U.N. civilians supervising the administration of the country or territory in which peace-keepers are deployed; U.N. officials monitoring elections and even providing security for the conduct of elections. Altogether, we have had a much greater civilian role in activities under the general rubric of peace-keeping.

As recently as a year or so ago, those of us speaking to audiences like this one would have tried to trace an increasing trend from the first type of peace-keeping to the second, and we thought that was already a major change. Now we have at least three more types to talk about that didn't exist a year ago.

The third type—again, in increasing order of distance from the familiar—is *preventive deployment*, sending out peace-keepers before there is a conflict. Here, essentially, the U.N. responds to a request either from both (or several) parties to a dispute and potential conflict or, if necessary, from only one—a party that says, "We would like you to send peace-keepers onto our territory, because we have good reason to believe that we may be attacked or that we might get embroiled in a wider conflict." That happened for the first time in December 1992, when the Security Council agreed to send a preventive deployment force to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The function of that force is to provide early warning for the Security Council; numbering some 750, it would not be adequate to repel an aggression if one were to occur.⁶ Its purpose is to monitor conditions, ring alarm bells in the Security Council, and, frankly, to increase the political price of aggression. It was Mikhail Gorbachev who first came up with the idea of preventive deployment, in one of his statements before the U.N. General Assembly; the Secretary-General reflected the concept in his *Agenda for Peace*, and it has now been put in place. These "preventive peace-keepers," however, *do* use traditional methods, so this type of peace-keeping is not quite as difficult for us to live with as the next two.

The fourth category is the business of using military peace-keepers (for want of a better word) for the *provision of humanitarian aid*. This has involved us, in the course of the last year, in attempting to deliver humanitarian relief supplies in the midst of raging civil wars, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia being the two most relevant cases.

It has meant a wide variety of functions that our peace-keepers haven't performed very often in the past—protecting civilian workers in the middle of a conflict, sometimes driving relief trucks, and in the case of Somalia trying to create a secure environment within which humanitarian aid could be delivered (in itself a situation that raises problems, of which I will speak presently).

The final type is the one we are hearing or seeing more and more of in the media these days, at least in this country: "*muscular peace-keeping*" (again, for want of a better term—and we might well have to invent new terms as we go along). What does that mean? "Muscular peace-keeping" means the use of military force to impose, essentially, the will of the international community on recalcitrant violators of the peace. The clamour for muscle is directed principally at Somalia and Bosnia. Even as we speak today [31 March 1993], there is in the Security Council a discussion and possibly a decision to impose the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina—in other words, a resolution involving the right to shoot down potential violators of the interdiction of flights imposed by the Security Council several months ago, an interdiction monitored in a totally traditional way, by unarmed observers at airfields. Now we have an enforcement provision from the Council. Also, in the context of the Vance-Owen Plan for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is much talk of a large, strong, muscular, well-equipped Nato force to go in and "implement"—people don't like the word "enforce"—the Plan, that is, to implement the Plan at the end of a gun (or of 75,000 guns). That is something which would fit into this fifth type of operation.

As I said earlier, until very recently the trend in peace-keeping had been away from the traditional, limited, buffer-zone style to the increasingly complex administration of overall comprehensive settlements, with a strongly civilian role. It has taken all of us by surprise to see the movement back now to a more military orientation and emphasis. It seems to be a move from what had been dubbed by one scholar "multi-dimensional peace-keeping operations" to a new debate about what is in many ways primarily one-dimensional—namely the military dimension, peace enforcement.

Principles under Pressure

I would like now to look, in the context of these types, at what has been called "the theology of peace-keeping operations" as the

United Nations has developed it and ask the question, "How is that theory under threat from today's pressures and from the prospects that confront us today?" When we spoke of principles of peace-keeping before the recent ferment, we spoke in effect of three broad sets of principles. Let us see what has happened to each of these.

The first was, we might say, the "*United Nations-ness*" of peace-keeping. That is, peace-keeping operations conducted by the blue helmets and blue berets had certain common characteristics: they were established by a legislative body of the United Nations, usually the Security Council. They were directed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who gave the orders to the force commander; in other words, all the personnel, military and civilian, involved were under the operational command of the United Nations Secretary-General, who reported, of course, on their work to the Security Council. They were collectively financed as what were termed "activities of the Organization," by the Member States of the United Nations. Further, they were staffed by troops from a wide variety of United Nations members—for the most part, as I said, the smaller and medium powers, though in the last year or two there has been an increasing willingness on the part of the Permanent Five also to participate in peace-keeping. Those elements would be broadly what we mean when we speak of the "*United Nations-ness*" of peace-keeping.

The second broad set of principles has to do with the *relations of the peace-keepers to the host governments*. Peace-keeping originally functioned on the principle that peace-keepers and the operation itself must have the consent of host governments (or the parties directly concerned if not recognized as governments), and it was accepted that their co-operation was, as a practical matter, essential. The rationale was, of course, that in keeping with Article 2, paragraph 7, of the U.N. Charter, a peace-keeping operation must not intervene in the internal affairs of a Member State: it was in the host country with that country's agreement, to do a particular job of work. The peace-keeping operation was not to favour one party against another—a matter not only of principle but of ensuring its own effectiveness, the idea being that a peace-keeping operation should not become part of the conflict that it had been set up to control or help resolve. Also, of course, a peace-keeping operation was always deployed without prejudice to the claims or the rights of the parties in that particular conflict. This made it altogether easier for the United Nations to deploy peace-keeping forces, in that there was less risk

for troop-contributing countries if the parties were willing to have the soldiers there. Further, there was more chance of success, because one was going there to do something that both or all sides to a conflict wanted one to do; without their active co-operation, peace-keepers faced an uphill task.

The final set of principles really flows from the concept that *peace-keeping is not peace enforcement*. When we sent military observers out, they were not armed; when we sent soldiers out, they were armed with very light defensive weapons. The litany was: we are not authorized to use force except in self-defense; we don't take sides; we're not there to win a war but to end one, or to prevent one from recurring. Accordingly, the Security Council in fact did not equip or authorize its peace-keepers to go beyond the minimal use of force. Let us not forget that military personnel in peace-keeping operations were provided by Member States on a voluntary basis and that it was understood that if the degree of risk was unacceptable, the troops would simply not be available to the U.N. We have had eight hundred fatalities in U.N. peace-keeping, and that's a fairly substantial number, but it is against over half a million soldiers who have served at one time or the other in U.N. peace-keeping over the decades.⁷ Peace-keepers were deployed to keep peace, not to make war; their major weapon was moral authority, not military strength.

How are these three broad doctrinal principles being called into question today, and why? They've been challenged essentially because of our experience on the ground over the last year, particularly in Somalia, Bosnia, and to a lesser extent Croatia as well, an experience which has revealed fundamental problems. For example, "United Nations-ness" as the basis for a U.N. operation has been questioned. Should indeed every operation be under the command and control of the Secretary-General? In the case of Somalia, after the first traditional peace-keeping operation went in, a coalition, UNITAF, was set up and directed by, essentially, the United States;⁸ it received its orders not from New York but from Washington. In Bosnia there has been a U.N. umbrella, but certainly one part of the operation—that of protecting humanitarian convoys—was actually constituted by a group of Member States that have worked together in Nato and had not quite acquired the habit of taking their instructions from the United Nations in New York.⁹

The whole matter of consent and co-operation is also being challenged. The U.N. approach of co-operating impartially with the

parties to the conflict has resulted in the Organization's being accused of condoning the actions of warlords and thugs of various sorts who have otherwise received the censure of the international community. Is impartiality a good thing if it is, or seems to be, amoral, if being impartial means refusing to distinguish between a cease-fire violation by an "aggressor" and a cease-fire violation by a so-called "victim"? Should consent and co-operation extend to those whose actions are largely condemned as unacceptable by the international community? In other words, is it better for the U.N. to force its way through than for it to negotiate its way past every roadblock?

There are new questions also about the consent of the parties to our deployment. One peace-keeping force, UNIKOM, has been imposed on Iraq under Chapter Seven, which invokes enforcement measures; another, the peace-keeping operation in the former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR, has also deployed forces without the explicit consent of the parties to their composition or command. Originally, UNPROFOR was a Chapter Six operation; it was made a Chapter Seven undertaking for the security of its personnel; then, in repeating its decision to place the Force under the enforcement chapter, the Security Council said it was "determined to ensure the security of the peace-keepers *and their freedom of movement*" (my emphasis)—one more area in which a show of force is, by implication, authorized. So there is a tendency now to move away from the consent and co-operation principle.

Now, what are the problems these deployments raise? One of the fundamental difficulties, of course, is that of deploying U.N. peace-keepers in countries or situations where there is really no peace to keep. Peace-keeping is, after all, a tool which has evolved over the years primarily in situations where there has been agreement amongst the parties to a conflict. The success of the peace-keepers has almost always been predicated upon the co-operation of the conflicting parties. In situations where there are no peace agreements—Bosnia or Somalia, for instance—where governments, with whom the U.N. is used to dealing, either do not exist or have limited effective authority and where the consent of the parties cannot always be assumed, how do we function? For international peace-keepers to work in the midst of a raging war; to negotiate their way daily; to cope with irregular political authorities and shadowy chains of command; to base their actions upon commitments which are violated as routinely as they are signed; to deal with armed elements whose discipline is nonexistent or brutal; to be shot at themselves,

sometimes by the very people they are there to protect and assist—all this is largely unfamiliar territory.

A number of questions arise in our minds as we explore this territory.¹⁰ Is peace-keeping the right tool to apply in such essentially humanitarian emergencies? Can it (quite literally) "deliver the goods" effectively when it is so easily impeded by the absence of good faith amongst the parties to a conflict? And indeed, is it enough for the United Nations to attempt to meet a humanitarian challenge through Dag Hammarskjöld's "Chapter Six and a Half," or do we need to conduct U.N. military activities under Chapter Seven? Is an enforcement capacity now essential to the success of peace-keeping? Or, if the United Nations wishes, on the other hand, to remain within the tried and tested principles of peace-keeping, is there a need to review the rules of engagement under which humanitarian assistance is to be delivered in times of conflict or settlements are to be imposed upon reluctant parties? If we do change the rules of engagement, to what extent might that affect other peace-keeping activities of the United Nations, sometimes in the same area? Can the United Nations remain impartial (as it must, we feel) in peace-keeping operations once it finds itself attacking a party or a party's members in the course of implementing its mandates? And finally, to what degree will Member States be willing to provide troops if the peace-keepers must fight their way in to do what they are to do? Is there a risk, therefore, that the consent and co-operation of governments will be more, not less, difficult to obtain in the future if peace-keeping becomes an instrument for saving some lives by taking others?

All these are questions to which there are no simple answers, and I ask them because I'm sure many of you have thought about them and have answers that may or may not be the same as the ones we in the U.N. have come up with as we cope with these questions on a daily basis. But I do want to dispose of one particular canard straight away, something we've seen too often in news commentary: that the U.N. rules of engagement are somehow fundamentally at fault. From our point of view, that has never really been the problem. While it's true that the rules of engagement have urged peace-keepers to use force only in self-defense, the rules have, at least since 1973, interpreted self-defense to mean not just firing back when fired upon, not just defense of one's own person or life, but also defense of one's mandate. In other words, it was always theoretically permissible, say, for U.N. troops to use armed force if others were attempting to use it to obstruct them while they were trying to fulfill the mandate

entrusted to them by the Security Council. Of course, this principle was applied with common sense; it doesn't make very much sense for a handful of soldiers, lightly equipped, to think of using force in a situation where—at least in the overall theatre—one is vastly outnumbered and outgunned (which has been the case, by the way, for practically every peace-keeping operation). The U.N. troops may well be able to use force if they have a few armoured personnel carriers at one particular roadblock manned by half a dozen people, but what happens at the next roadblock, or the third one, or the fourth? What happens to their vulnerable comrades elsewhere—relief workers, unarmed observers, airfield monitors, civilian police—when the friends and comrades of those at the roadblocks decide to react to the U.N.'s use of force? It has always been the U.N. peace-keepers themselves who have had to be asking those questions, largely because peace-keeping has been financed and equipped on a shoestring. In the past, we got used to the Security Council's cutting down the initial size of a proposed force for financial reasons; we've never had the luxury of being the overwhelming force on the ground. Therefore, one has to apply one's rules of engagement with the basic common-sense constraint that while one may theoretically be able to use force, one had best think several times before actually pulling that trigger.

What we need, then, is not so much to rewrite the rules of engagement as to reconceive their application, if you like, so as to provide these "more muscular" peace-keepers with adequate strength, with levels of personnel, equipment, and armament that will make it the drunken lout at the roadblock who thinks twice and not the U.N. peace-keeper.

But still, other questions come to mind. I mentioned the prospect of a no-fly-zone enforcement resolution. This is going to put the United Nations in the position where its peace-keepers, wearing blue and not terribly heavily armed, will in effect be making war and peace at the same time. In effect, unarmed observers and monitors at the airfields will be attempting to monitor, peace-keeping style, a resolution which other people sitting in aircraft might be enforcing at the press of a button (or at least the threat of pressing it); fundamental dilemmas arise about the viability and security of those unarmed soldiers on the ground.¹¹

Let us mention just one more U.N. principle that is under pressure—command and control. It is an important principle from the

Secretary-General's point of view that the United Nations alone gives instructions to peace-keeping operations. After all, when a peace-keeping operation flies the U.N. flag and wears the blue helmet, it visibly represents the collective will of the international community. It means a great deal to have Swedes, Ghanaians, Bangladeshis, Fijians, and Argentinians all serving together in an area in which none of their countries has a direct stake. That is the traditional face of U.N. peace-keeping. But when we have in hand the kind of operation contemplated for implementing an overall peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, can we do things that way? Can we expect the United Nations to contact thirty-five countries and get their soldiers together, for the first time, for an operation that might need 75,000 people? For the much smaller, less ambitious job of sending troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect humanitarian convoys, we took a Nato headquarters "off the shelf" and asked it to run the operation. But if we do that again, how feasible will it be for the United Nations to involve countries that have not worked with Nato? How do we uphold the universality that, for us, is normally an end in itself? These are questions that I think remain fundamental if the United Nations is to provide the umbrella for such activity. Perhaps it is naive to imagine that one day we will manage to combine the idealism and universalism of the "amateur" days of U.N. peace-keeping with the professionalism, technological sophistication, and will-to-win of the big military powers. But it is a balance worth striving for.

Challenge and Opportunity

To conclude, let us look at the main challenges that confront us. Peace-keeping is, after all, a tool that has worked—has worked in certain finite situations, but well enough for it to receive the recognition of the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1988. In today's flux and ferment, the challenge is both to do the right thing and to do the thing right. We have to figure out the applicability of the tools at our disposal in the different situations that the Security Council is now confronted with. If peace-keeping is not the right tool in a particular situation, maybe it is time we started saying so. If there cannot be a clear and practicable mandate that peace-keepers can implement, then maybe, indeed, we need to question whether peace-keepers should be sent to implement it. There is a syndrome—one I know all soldiers are familiar with in their own domestic contexts—in which public opinion is ahead of military logic and the *"don't just stand*

there, DO something" approach leads to soldiers being sent out into situations in which it is not entirely feasible to "do" the "something" that is expected.

But by attempting to do that for which one is not equipped, authorized, financed, or supported, the credibility of an otherwise extremely useful mechanism is put at risk. We have to ask ourselves, of course, when we look at this business of credibility, what the criteria should be for launching a peace-keeping activity or a military intervention. We have to ask ourselves why we, the international community, should go into Bosnia but not Southern Sudan—where there are perhaps just as many human beings dying in conditions of wretchedness and misery in the midst of a war. Why one and not the other? In what terms might success be feasible in one but not realistically expected in the other?

So much for doing the right thing; but what about doing the thing right? Clearly, there is a fundamental question as to how effectively the United Nations can run this new generation of peace-keeping.

We are already rethinking our administrative and logistical infrastructure at headquarters in New York to provide the kind of direction that the U.N. will inevitably, eventually, have to give peace-keeping operations. We are determined now to improve our planning capacity, which is, frankly, nonexistent—too often a political officer and a colonel rushing off for a couple of weeks or less at the start of a peace-keeping operation. That has to change. Also, we're finally going to bite the bullet and invent a "situation room," which the United Nations has never had. We have never had a twenty-four-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week capacity—except, of course, by virtue of being woken up at night by phone calls from generals in the field wanting to give us bad news or get urgent policy guidance. This again is something that the United Nations recognizes will have to change.¹² We are a small department; there are under thirty people in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations at United Nations Headquarters, both military and political (and secretaries, I hasten to add). That clearly cannot continue. We've had visitors from the Pentagon raise several eyebrows at once when they heard that number. At the same time, however, we have to ask ourselves if we can get personnel, both for headquarters work and in the field, who are not only willing to do the new things that need to be done but are adequately trained and equipped for them. We have had excellent battalions and soldiers from countries that simply

cannot afford to give them the kind of equipment, which in many Western nations would be considered basic, needed to meet the minimum standards for effective military activity even in the context of an existing agreement. And yet we don't have the equipment ourselves to give them, nor the capacity to obtain it easily for them from those who do. There too the question of how the world can collectively gear itself up to do this remains to be asked.

Then there is the important question of finance. The General Assembly every year passes resolutions saying that Member States should pay their dues for peace-keeping activities on time and in full. Well, I can tell you that when every operation is set up, an assessment letter goes to Member States (I cannot call it a fund-raising letter because these are *obligatory* assessments that Member States are expected to pay within thirty days). The average collection rate, three months after this letter goes out, has been 36.7 percent; at the end of six months, 50 percent.¹³ Without money coming in, how can we run the kind of large-scale, ambitious peace-keeping activities that we're talking about today? In December of last year, the General Assembly approved a Reserve Fund for peace-keeping operations in the amount of \$150 million, but in fact that fund contains only \$16 million today.¹⁴ So, every time an operation starts, we have to get the money, then place the orders, arrange the ships, and get equipment out to where it is needed. That's the kind of constraint under which the U.N. has been working.

To this day we have no reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment. We have no collection of jeeps, radios, tents, generators, or prefabs, other than a very limited stock in Pisa, Italy. We have almost nothing that we can simply call upon when we set up a peace-keeping operation. It may be instructive, I think, to those dealing with military budgets to know that the entire, cumulative, aggregate, expenditure on U.N. peace-keeping since 1945 has been \$8.3 billion. If we deploy the kind of force that Nato estimates would be required in Bosnia-Herzegovina to implement a settlement, we might be spending \$8.3 billion in one year, let alone in forty-eight. The question really has to be asked: Where is this money going to come from?

Peace-keeping is not cheap, but it is a good deal cheaper than the alternative. I think it is worth mentioning that during Desert Storm, judging by the numbers that we read in the press, two days' expenditure on that operation would have paid for the entire United

Nations peace-keeping budget for the year 1991. So there is a difference in scale here. We would like to feel that governments, when they look at their defense budgets, might think in terms of supporting peace-keeping a little more fully than they have. Even in a classic operation like UNIIMOG, in which military observers were deployed on the Iran-Iraq border mainly to uphold the cease-fire, the entire cost annually was less than the value of the crude oil two supertankers might carry.¹⁵ If you recall how many supertankers were under threat during that particular conflict, you can see why we feel that peace-keeping is not such a bad bargain.

I've tried to touch on a range of ideas and concerns, and I am conscious of having raised more questions than I've really begun to answer. I would like to end with the thought that peace-keeping, despite everything, has made a difference and can continue to make a difference. The ultimate measure of the success of peace-keeping as a tool in the hands of the international community has been the contribution it can make to a just and lasting solution of a conflict. This is why those of us who work in peace-keeping don't lose hope. Yesterday's conflicts have largely been solved—they are not today's conflicts. If peace-keeping and the military capacity of the international community can be used effectively, today's conflicts need not remain conflicts tomorrow.

NOTES

1. Since the speech was delivered, this figure has risen (as of December 1993) to eighteen. The operations are: United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), the Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), the Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), the Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), the Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), the Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), the Uganda-Rwanda Operation (UNOMUR), the Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), the Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), and the Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).

2. The figure did climb, reaching 80,000 in late 1993.

3. Within months of this speech, a revamped Somalia operation—UNOSOM II—went on to overtake both UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia) and UNTAC (Cambodia).

4. Some of late have begun objecting to the term "evolution of peace-keeping." For instance, Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations until early 1993, suggests that whereas "evolution" implies a somewhat orderly process of change, as it were a biological adjustment and transformation in reaction to events, what has been seen of late is instead the "forced development of peace-keeping."

5. For the notion of a "continuum," see, for example, John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1992, pp. 113-31.

6. Since increased by a three-hundred-man U.S. Army contingent.

7. Over a hundred new fatalities have occurred since the speech, mainly in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.

8. UNITAF: the United Task Force, a U.S.-led coalition that did *not* use the U.N. flag or wear blue helmets.

9. As a result of the difficulties hinted at by the speaker, this part of the UNPROFOR operation, initially established at no cost to the U.N., was later fully absorbed into the force's operational, budgetary, and command structures.

10. It is interesting to recall that these questions were raised four months *before* "muscular peace-keeping" went awry in Somalia.

11. Such concerns may have contributed to the fact that over a thousand violations had occurred by December 1993 without hostile action having been taken.

12. This has indeed occurred, and the U.N. now boasts a twenty-four-hour, seven-day situation centre staffed largely by military officers seconded to it by Member States.

13. By December 1993 these figures had improved marginally, to 45 percent after three months and 65 percent after six.

14. As of December 1993, the Reserve Fund held less than \$300,000—under 0.25 percent of the level authorized the year previously.

15. UNIIMOG: the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group.